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The Multicultural Drama: Religion’s Failure and Challenge 
Johannes A. van der Ven  
Abstract: Western civilization is the product of the syncretism and polytheism of Greek 
and Roman antiquity. In the course of history, Christians moved from a state of relative 
insignificance to an oppressed minority group until the fourth century when they 
became oppressors of other minority groups. A more tolerant approach to religious 
interaction, articulated by Aquinas in the middle ages, was still intent on sacrificing 
human freedom to the power of the majority. There is yet a fourth approach with a 
strong pedigree in the Western tradition and contemporary theology: religious freedom 
in a human rights framework. This is the only truly civilised model of Western 
civilisation that respects the freedom, equality and reciprocity of both majority and 
minority religious groups. The question is whether the Christian churches are sufficiently 
human rights-minded to take this leap towards cultural diversity and religious 
pluralism?  
Key Words: Western civilization; Clash of Civilizations; multiculturalism; tolerance; 
religious freedom; human rights; syncretism; oppression 
n Book IV of ‘The Republic’ Plato gives a report of the dialogue Socrates has with one 
of his dialogue partners, Adeimantus, about the question what makes a city a just 
and good city. Do you know, Socrates asks, what the difference is between Athens, our city, 
and the barbarian cities? It is this that Athens is united, it is a unity, it is one. The 
barbarian cities, Socrates says, are “in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the 
other the city of the rich.”1 Our city, Athens, is just and good, Socrates says, the barbarian 
cities are not just and not good, because they are divided into two. 
From this perspective, today all our cities of are barbarian cities, because they are 
divided into two. With its millions and millions of poor shacks not only is New Delhi a 
barbarian city, but also Johannesburg with its millions and millions of squatters, and Rio 
de Janeiro with its millions and millions of peoples in favellas, but also many western 
cities, like New York with its innumerable black quarters, London with its quarters full of 
inhabitants from its former colonies, Antwerp with is dangerous sections and Rotterdam 
with plenty of its no-go areas. Even Athens has become a barbarian city. Europe is full of 
barbarian cities. Why? 
Millions and millions of people from Africa, Asia and the Middle East have 
immigrated and are immigrating to Europe all the time. Socio-economic research has 
shown that these migrants are badly off. The majority manifest a fairly high dropout rate 
at school, unemployment is relatively high, and so are criminality and membership of the 
social underclass. Religiously, too, they pose a problem. In the foreseeable future Muslims 
will constitute 10 to 15 percent of the population of a number of European countries. 
Because of ongoing secularisation among Christians in these countries this could well 
                                                             
1 Plato, The Republic, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Vintage, 1991), [423], 132-133. 
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leave us with two equally large religions: Christianity and Islam. The question is: is society 
in these countries threatening to split into two parts, both socio-economically and socio-
culturally as well as religiously? There is a further question: will the social democratic 
constitutional state prove up to this danger and be able to find a solution? These are not 
academic questions. Amnesty International’s report this year tells us that there is growing 
racism and intolerance of Arab, Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe, and increasing 
interethnic violence.2 
Why do I call attention to this European problem here, in Australia? This year’s 
Amnesty International report on Australia records that the economic, social and cultural 
situation of aborigines is causing politicians great concern.3 In that respect their situation 
seems to be much the same as that of religious minorities in Europe: they too are mainly 
on the margins of society. Of course, the problems with the aborigines and the European 
problems with the migrant minorities differ as regards origin, history and context. But 
they are similar in the sense that there is a divide between majority and minority, each 
with its own socio-economic, socio-cultural and religious attributes. What concerns us is 
this: where are we failing and where are we succeeding? That is the question on which I 
want to reflect with you. 
INTERACTION MODELS 
In 2002 Samuel Huntington published his international bestseller entitled The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. His thesis is that conflicts around the globe 
can be traced back to clashes between civilisations, and hence between major religions. He 
mentions five: the Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic and Christian civilisations. He 
includes the Latin American culture with the Christian civilisation, African cultures in the 
northern and eastern parts with Islamic civilisation and in the south with Christian 
civilisation.4 
Huntington’s question is: how should these civilisations interact to avoid conflicts 
and prevent wars? His answer is: accept multiculturalism at a global level but settle for 
monoculturalism at a societal level. This applies particularly to Western civilisation, he 
says, otherwise it will be trodden underfoot and disappear.5 My question is this: is 
Huntington right in advocating a monocultural society? Is the alternative indeed the end of 
Western civilisation? 
To answer the question I want to dip into the history of Western civilisation. I want 
to see how Western civilisation dealt with various minorities on its territory in the past. In 
so doing my concern is not so much with history per se as with finding models of the 
relation between majorities and minorities. The interaction models I identify are 
obviously not exclusive to one period only but resurface in subsequent eras as well, 
whether in hybrid form or otherwise. Let me treat these models as ideal types in Max 
Weber’s sense. This entails a search expedition into history, but also abstraction from it so 
                                                             
2 http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/2eu-index-eng: “Entrenched racism, discrimination and intolerance 
were seen in attakcs on members of Arab, Jewish and Muslim communities, in interethnic violence (…).” 
3 http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/aus-summary-eng: “In October, the Council of Social Services reported 
that the gap between indigenous and non-indigenous people in health, education, employment and housing 
remained a concern.” 
4 Maybe African civilisation in the southern parts will develop into a sub-Saharan Africa with its own, distinct 
civilisation because of burgeoning  tribal identities. But nobody can tell that for sure,  says S. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Free Press, 2002),47. 
5 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 301-321. 
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as to use that history for purposes of illustration. I distinguish between four interaction 
models: (1) syncretism; (2) oppression; (3) tolerance; and (4) finally religious freedom in 
a human rights framework. 
(1) Syncretism 
If one undertakes a search of Western civilisation, one must know where to start. Do we 
start with classical antiquity? With the Renaissance that saw itself, drawing on antiquity, 
as the humanistic cradle of Europe? With the Enlightenment and its principles of 
democracy and human rights? With the European Community and the Treaty of Rome in 
1957? With the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989? Or does Europe not even exist, 
considering the rejection of its constitution by the French and Dutch populations a couple 
of weeks ago? These are awkward questions, in which economics and politicstend to 
merge ideologically.6 Let me take a linguistic starting point. The name ‘Europe’ was first 
used in the 7th century BC when the Greeks divided the world into three parts: “the 
Peloponnese, Europe and the islands whose shores are lapped by the sea”, that is the 
Mediterranean. In the 6th century  Hecataeus of Miletos divided the world into two: Asia, 
which included North Africa, and Europe.7 The Mediterranean was seen as a connecting 
link, its ports serving as intersections in trade routes and networks and between trading 
blocs and empires. This was known as the circum-Mediterranean.8 
Greek civilisation first assumed cosmopolitan dimensions in a harbour city  
Alexandria, established in the Nile delta by Alexander the Great in 331 BC. Very soon it 
became the centre of Hellenistic culture. Alexander not only conquered all the city states 
in Greece, but also the Greek world in Asia Minor and the commercial cities in Egypt, Syria 
and Babylonia (Iraq), as well as large parts of the Persian empire (Iran). Throughout this 
enormous territory he sought to introduce the Greek language and culture, but also 
showed respect for the existing Babylonian, Egyptian, Persian and Syrian heritage, which 
he permitted to coexist with Greek culture and combine with it. He greatly admired the 
Zoroastrian culture of Persia with its imaginative battlefield between good and evil, and 
the Hindu culture of India its religion, philosophy and cosmology, its applied arts and 
technology. Alexandria with itsMuseion, which was museum, library and university in one, 
grew into the cosmopolitan centre of the world, the home of great scholars such as the 
mathematician Euclid, the cosmologist Ptolemy, the physicist Archimedes, and the 
physician Galen.9  
When the Roman legions started conquering the circum-Mediterranean from the 
2nd century BC onwards Hellenistic civilisation did not disappear but established itself in 
the Roman empire. The resultant Graeco-Roman culture remained fundamentally open to 
both extraneous and internal influences. There were no ethnic or religious boundaries 
within this vast empire. Anyone who chose to be nourished by the culture of the Greek 
paideia could secure any post he liked. The sole condition was that he had to be a Roman 
citizen, but this prerogative was gradually extended to one city after another until the 3rd 
century AD, when all free inhabitants of the empire were granted Roman citizenship. 
Everyone who acquired this citizenship was equal before the law and had  albeit still 
                                                             
6 Sami Zemni, “Islam: European Identity and the Limits of Multiculturalism,” in Religious Freedom and the 
Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 158-173. 
7 P. Riebergen, Europe: A Cultural History (London, New York: 1998), 32. 
8 H. Driessen, Mediterrane passages: Een zeewaartse visie op een overgangsgebied (Amsterdam: 
Wereldbibliotheek, 2002). 
9 Rietbergen, Europe, 34-35. 
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limited  democratic civil rights, similar to those obtaining in many Greek cities in the 
past. It made no difference whether one resided in London on the Thames, in Trier on the 
Rhine, in the environs of Vienna on the Danube, or in a city on the Euphrates. The empire 
was explicitly tolerant towards the various religions within its borders and in Rome all 
kinds of cults and liturgies were adopted, such as the Iris and Isis cult from Egypt, the 
Indo-Persian Mithras cult, the worship of Cybele from Asia Minor and the devotion of the 
Persian prophet Mani. The clearest symbol of this religious mingling or syncretism was 
the Pantheon in Rome, a temple which accommodated the Greek and Roman gods, as well 
as those of conquered peoples.10 
So is Huntington right in asserting that Western civilisation can only be rescued in a 
monocultural society? The answer is the exact opposite: Western civilisation is a product 
of the syncretism and polytheism of Greek and Roman antiquity. To be sure, this was 
followed by Christian monotheism, but that was a familiar figure. After all, scholars accept 
that, only a few centuries earlier, Jewish monotheism emerged in Jerusalem from the 
pantheon of the first temple, where Yahweh originally was a higher god, in order to 
ultimately become the highest god, even the supreme God.11 Polytheism and monotheism 
can succeed each other and are in no way mutually exclusive, at any rate not if it is 
acknowledged that polytheism is often founded on belief in a higher or highest deity.12 
Outside Christendom syncretism continued on a grand scale, notably in Hinduism. There it 
was both cause and effect of the polytheistic pantheon that makes Hinduism  when it 
does not lapse into radicalism  a tolerant religion. But within Christianity, too, there are 
syncretist phenomena, especially in Christian folk religiosity, where indigenous religiosity, 
such as that of traditional African religions, merges with Protestant and Catholic 
ritualism.13 But among (the higher strata of) Christian westerners syncretist phenomena 
can be observed, also, especially among those who practise various kinds of what is called 
double belonging and consider themselves ‘hyphenated Christians’, like a Hindu-Christian, 
a Buddhist-Christian, a Tao-Christian.14 On the other hand one discerns strong tendencies 
towards anti-syncretism. These reject syncretism, because the intermingling of elements 
                                                             
10 Riebergen, Europe, 38-62. 
11 D.V. Edelman (ed.), The Triumph of Elohim: From Yahwisms to Judaisms (Kampen: Pharos, 1995). 
12 J. Assmann, Moses der Ägypter. Entzifferung einer Gedächtnisspur, Fischer, Frankfurt 2001,120. 
13 R. Bell, “Understanding African Philosophy from a non-African Point of View: An Exercise in Cross-Cultural 
Philosophy,” in E. Eze (ed.), Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 197-
220. Here the various elements can be combined in a single ritual, such as ancestor veneration or healing 
ceromonies in a Christian church service. But it may also happen that the rituals are kept separate, so that one 
would go to the eucharist on Sunday morning and in the afternoon visit traditional healers (K. Appiah, In My 
Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 29; K. Appiah, 
“Old Gods, New Worlds,” in P. Coetzee & A. Roux (eds.), Philosophy from Africa: A Text with 
Readings (Johannesburg: International Thomson Publishing, 1998), 245-274). This latter form of syncretism 
could be called dual belonging (see further), to be regarded as a positive development since it entails retaining 
the old without rejecting the new. But it can also be evaluated negatively, because visiting traditional healers 
implies maintaining a particular form of ‘superstition’ that prevents autonomous personal development, or 
because the combination of celebrating the eucharist and visiting traditional healers obstructs integrated 
personal development, with the result that dual loyalty is in fact a divisive loyalty. For a positive evaluation: W. 
Valkenberg, “The future of Religion: From Interreligious Dialogue to Multiple Religious Identity?,” Studies in 
Interreligious Dialogue 14.1 (2004): 95-107. For a negative evaluation: M. Van Heerden, What’s Happening in 
Practice? A Comparative Study of Teaching and Learning in Two Desegregated South African Public High Schools 
(Pretoria: Unisa, 1998); M. Van Heerden, “My School, your School, our School? Issues of Attitude, Behaviour 
and Identity among Black and White Pupils in Desegregated South African High Schools,” South African Journal 
of Ethnology 22.2 (1999): 67-80.  Masolo 1994; Appiah 1992; 1996; Van Heerden 1998, 111; 1999, 77. 
14 C. Cornille (ed.), Many Mansions? (New York: Orbis Books, 2002). 
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from foreign religions is considered harmful to their own religions.15 There are those who 
maintain that the present pope, in his previous position as prefect of the Congregation of 
Faith, put such emphasis on the uniqueness and absoluteness of Jesus in the document 
Dominus Jesus in 2000 that it completely squashed every form of syncretism, particularly 
in Africa and Asia.16 
(2) Oppression 
To resume the thread of history, one finds that the Christian groups that arose within the 
Roman empire were initially regarded as ‘yet another crazy Jewish sect’. In the syncretist 
context of the empire they were tolerated, along with Judaism. They did not cause much of 
a stir, since they were socially insignificant, belonged to the lower strata and practised 
their religion more or less underground. By the 3rd century, however, they started to 
become suspect, because they refused to take part in sacrificial rituals to the gods and pay 
divine homage to the emperor, the religious symbol of political unity. As a result they were 
gradually subjected to slurs, accusations, intimidation and persecution. Their houses were 
set alight, they were rounded up, interrogated, enticed to take part in sacrificial rituals, 
tortured and killed. 
Then, early in the 4th century, things changed. In 311 they were accorded the status 
of an allowed religion (religio licita), with the same rights as other religions. In 312 
emperor Constantine even granted them financial and judicial privileges, out of political 
rather than purely religious motives. Christianity was set up as a barricade against the 
religio-political agitation of the Donatists in North Africa. Finally, in 321, Sunday was 
proclaimed the official day of rest throughout the empire. But the real turning point was 
still to come. In 380 emperor Theodosius made Christianity the official religion in the 
empire and faith in the triune God  Father, Son and Spirit  became statutory. In 394 he 
expanded this to the West as well. In other words, what is known as the Constantinian 
shift was in fact the Theodosian shift.17 The result was that Christianity, like the erstwhile 
cultic religions of late antiquity, came to fulfil a political function. It had to ensure the 
cohesion of the Roman empire, provide an ideological basis for the power of the emperor 
and the political elite, and promote an ethics conducive to the empire. Thus commitment 
to God’s will turned into commitment to the will of the political elite. In this context 
Christianity could not resist the temptation to oppress and even exterminate other 
religions. From being the oppressed Christians turned into oppressors. 
The change this effected is evident in the position of Augustine, the most eminent 
church father at the time. Initially he had emphasised freedom of belief: “Human beings 
cannot believe unless they themselves want to.”18 But because of the agitation of the 
Donatists in North Africa, who joined forces against the church’s sacramental practice and 
hierarchy and thus posed a danger to the stability of the empire, he changed his view. 
After that he not only supported forcible imperial action against dissidents within the 
church, but also advocated the use of force outside the church for converting non-
                                                             
15 A. Droogers, “Syncretism: The problem of Definition, the Definition of the Problem,” in J. Gort et al. (eds.), 
Dialogue and Syncretism: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 7-25; C. Stewart & R. 
Shaw (eds.), Syncretism/Anti-Syncretism: The Politics of Religious Synthesis (London: Routledge, 1994). 
16 P. Jenkins,The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
17 E. Schillbeeckx, Pleidooi voor mensen in de kerk (Baarn: Nelissen, 1985), 143. 
18 Augustinus, In Johannis, 26.2: “Credere non potest homo nisi volens.” 
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believers, baptising them and making them join the church. As a result religious freedom 
turned into religious coercion.19 
I am not saying that Huntington is advocating the use of oppression, forced 
conversion and death threats to establish a monocultural society. Besides, a politics of 
conversion at gunpoint is no longer found in the West these days. But that does not 
exclude all sorts of conscious or unconscious manipulations on a smaller scale, in families 
and religious communities, to entice children and adults to adopt ideas and practices that 
they previously resisted. Of course, these pale into insignificance when compared with the 
massive, violently enforced conversions in the latter days of the Roman empire and the 
Middle Ages, for instance during the politically motivated and militarily coerced adoption 
of Christianity by the barbarian peoples in the North,20 the crusades in the East21 and, later 
on,  the conquest of America in the West.22 
(3) Tolerance 
In the Middle Ages, however, there was a theologian who explicitly rejected the model of 
oppression and forced conversion eventually advocated by Augustine, and reverted to 
Augustine’s earlier insistence on freedom of faith. This was Thomas Aquinas, who roundly 
asserted that nobody should be coerced into believing. He went further, maintaining that 
the rites of people of other faiths, specifically Jews and Muslims, had to be tolerated. The 
principle on which he based this statement was, in positive terms, that an evil sometimes 
had to be tolerated for the sake of a particular good, or, in negative terms, that one 
sometimes had to tolerate an evil in order to avoid an even greater evil. The faith of Jews 
and Muslims was undoubtedly an evil, since one way or another it was a product of 
unbelief although Thomas did distinguish between Jews and Muslims: the Jews had 
prefigured the true faith, whereas the faith of Muslims, he said, contained nothing that was 
                                                             
19 R. Forst, Toleranz im Konflikt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2003), 69-82. 
20 In the latter days of the Roman empire and the period that followed mass conversion continued wholesale, 
with the word ‘conversion’ calling for quotation marks. This was not only because of the military coercion 
which attended the process, but also because of the Gefolgschaftsdenken, which meant that all soldiers, 
supporters and subjects were expected to follow the lord/leader in his adoption of Christianity. The result was 
delayed social and mental penetration: Christianity reached the masses later than the elite, and really 
intensive penetration of the faith among the populace took even longer. Often ‘conversion’ remained confined 
to purely external behaviour for a long time, with the result that ‘pagan’ and Christian notions and practices 
continued side by side as a kind of dual strategy, prompting some commentators to speak of a double 
insurance policy (Bredero 2000; Blockmans & Hoppenbrouwers 2002, 89 A. Bredero, De ontkerstening der 
middeleeuwen: Een terugblik op de geschiedenis van twaalf eeuwen christendom (Baarn: Agora, 2000); W. 
Blockmans & P. Hoppenbrouwers, Eeuwen des onderscheids: Een geschiedenis van middeleeuws 
Europa (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2002).The conjunction of secular and spiritual power, evidenced by the 
‘conversion’ of entire nations, sometimes also led to a paralysing power struggle between the two, as a result 
of which some nations reverted wholly to ‘pagandom’ for long periods: J. Le Goff, Le Civilisation de l’Occident 
Médiéval, Dutch translation De cultuur van middeleeuws Europa (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 1987), 53. 
21 Bernhard of Clairvaux’s motto in the second crusade was that killing in Christ’s name could be undertaken 
with a clean conscience; cf. R. Forst, Toleranz im Konflikt, 89. 
22 There, too, indigenous people were slaughtered wholesale in the name of religion, and only a relatively small 
group of Spanish Dominicans championed natural law based indigenous people’s right to freedom from violent 
missionary activity; cf. K. Hilpert, Menschenrechte und Theologie, Forschungsbeiträge zur ethischen Dimension 
der Menschenrechte (Freiburg: Herder, 2001); R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); R. Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and 
the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); R. Ruston, “Theologians, 
Humanists and Natural Rights,” in M. Hill (ed.), Religious Liberty and Human Rights (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 2002), 14-44. 
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either true or useful. But both faiths could be tolerated to achieve a greater good, namely 
social unity, or to avoid a greater evil, namely social strife.23  
Sometimes one hopes that this minimal injunction of Thomas’ would be heeded in 
our day and age. I certainly don’t mean that the faith of Jews and Muslims is basically 
sinful, nor that Judaism merely prefigured truth and that Islam contains nothing that is 
either true or useful. But it would be a blessing if the various religions were to tolerate one 
another, even if only for the sake of social harmony and to prevent societies from sliding 
into civil, international or continental wars. 
Still I call Thomas’s advice a minimal injunction. For simply to tolerate other 
religions, not for their own sake but to further an extraneous good or avert an evil, is to 
treat these religions purely as instruments, and moreover as instruments that are 
imperfect, if not, evil in themselves. Besides, such tolerance can be revoked once the 
greater evil has ceased to exist. So when a religious minority ceases to threaten social 
harmony anymore, one can placidly resume oppressing them. As late as the 20th century, 
right up to the discussions of Vatican II between 1962 and 1965, that was the Catholic 
Church’s official doctrine.24 This doctrine reads: when Catholics constitute a majority 
tolerance of minorities is undesirable; but if they themselves are a minority, tolerance is 
necessary.25 The principle at issue is that truth has priority over freedom: when truth is at 
stake, freedom goes by the board. And since the Catholic Church has a monopoly of truth, 
the freedom of other religions has to be subordinated to it.26  
This principle is not obsolete. For the notion of tolerance, albeit in tempered form, is 
still part of the Catholic Church’s dominant thinking. I am not saying that other religions 
are still regarded as an evil, or even as sinful, but neither are they seen entirely as a good, 
as good in themselves. Inasmuch as they contain elements corresponding with elements of 
Catholic doctrine they are considered good. But inasmuch as they contain deviant 
elements they are simply tolerated, permitted, endured, an evil to be tacitly ignored. That 
is the axiom of inclusivism one finds in the aforementioned  Dominus Jesus document of 
2000. It is no different from Thomas Aquinas: other religions are tolerated so as not to 
provoke conflict and jeopardise peace. 
That could be the model that Huntington, and many Westerners like him, have in 
mind. According to this model there is a majority that wields authority, while the minority 
is tolerated in so far as they adapt to the majority. Or, as right-wing parties in Europe 
would have it, Western culture is the dominant culture (Leitkultur) and minorities have to 
conform to it. It is like hearing Karl Marx: the ruling culture is that of the ruling class, and 
the ruling class is the class that rules the economy and politics.27 Permissive tolerance is 
based on us-them thinking, on thinking in terms of in-group and out-group; it is aimed at 
inclusion and exclusion. Empirical research in fifteen European countries has revealed a 
strong correlation between religion, ethno-centrism and prejudice.28 This especially 
                                                             
23 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundae q. 10 a.1, a.11: “Nihil veritatis aut utilitatis.” 
24 E.-W. Böckenförde, Kirche und christlicher Glaube in den Herausforderungen der Zeit (Münster, 2004), 203. 
25 After all, the view underlying all this is that the church does not approve the other religions but merely 
permits them (“ecclesia non approbat, sed permittit”). 
26 E.-W. Böckenförde, Kirche und christlicher Glaube, 205. 
27 K. Marx, Die Frühschriften (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1971), 373-374 
28 M. Gijsberts, P. Scheepers & P. Coenders, “Exclusion of Legal Migrants in Western Europe,” in M. Gijsberts, L. 
Hagendoorn & P. Scheepers (eds.), Nationalism and Exclusion of Migrants: Cross-National Comparisons (Hants: 
Ashgate, 2004), 121-142, here 134-135; P. Scheepers, M. Gijsberts & E. Hello, “Religiosity and Prejudice against 
Ethnic Minorities in Europe: Cross-National Tests on a Controversial Relationship,” Review of Religious 
Research 43.3 (2002): 242-265. 
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applies to so-called nominal Christians,29 of whom William James already in 1902 said: 
“Piety is the mask, the inner force is tribal instinct.”30 But we also know that among the 
youth in various countries around the world religious exclusivism ranks low or even very 
low.31 But besides of that, permissive tolerance boils down to disciplining minorities in 
order to retain and strengthen the majority’s power.32 Put differently: the truth the 
majority claims for itself is a truth of majority power, to which the freedom of minorities 
has to yield. 
(4) Religious Freedom in a Human Rights Framework 
Is there a different model – one in which minorities are not just tolerated but respected? 
Indeed there is: religious freedom in the framework of human rights.33 It does not offer a 
cut and dried solution but a framework in which to achieve peace between cultures and 
religions. Remarkably, at the last moment, right at the end of Vatican II the same Catholic 
Church that used to avail itself of the models of oppression and tolerance adopted the 
declaration on religious freedom, starting with the words ‘human dignity.’34 Through this 
act (in actu excercitu) the Catholic Church indicated that the infallibility it lays claim to 
goes hand in hand with fallible, subsequently reviewed or reviewable views, for this was a 
case of changing from ‘notion A’ to ‘notion non-A’, as the lawyer, staatskirchenrechtler 
Böckenförde put it.35 Originally the text on religious freedom was to be inserted in the 
constitution on the church, Lumen Gentium (a constitution being the highest rank of a 
dogmatic document), then in the decree on ecumenism (a decree ranking below a 
constitution); in the end it appeared as a separate declaration, that being the lowest 
ranking document in the dogmatic hierarchy.36 Nonetheless the current president of the 
pontifical council for ecumenism, Walter Kasper, then still professor of theology at 
Tübingen, maintained that this was the most important document produced by Vatican 
II.37 
The term ‘human dignity’, the opening words of the document, does not come from 
nowhere. It derives from classical antiquity. In political philosophy it referred to the 
                                                             
29 J. Christopher Soper & J. Fetzer, “Religion and Politics in Europe,” in T.G. Jelen & C. Wilcox, Religion and 
Politics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 169-194, here 182. 
30 W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience (New York 1902), 331. 
31 H.-G. Ziebertz, “Religious Pluralism and Religious Education,” Journal of Empirical Theology 6.2 (1993): 82-
99; J.A. van der Ven, “Religious Values in the Interreligious Dialogue,” Religion & Theology 1.3 (1994): 244-260; 
P. Vermeer & J.A. an der Ven, “Looking at the Relationship between Religions: An Empirical Study among 
Secondary School Students,” Journal of Empirical Theology (2004):1; J.A. van der Ven. J.S. Dreyer, H.J.C. 
Pieterse, Is there a God of Human Rights? The Complex Relationship between Human Rights and Religion: A South 
African Case (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 553; F.-V. Anthony, “Interreligious Conflict and Participation: An Empirical 
Study among the Youth in Tamil Nadu, India (paper, second conference of the International Society of 
Empirical Research in Theology (ISERT), Bielefeld, 22-24 April 2004), in which the attitude scale 
'commonality-based mutuality' substantively represents pluralism. 
32 Forst, Toleranz im Konflikt, 86. 
33 P. Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration came to the West (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), considers - to my mind wrongly - the dividing line between tolerance and religious freedom to be 
fluid. 
34 On the very last day of the council, 7 December 1965, with 2308 votes for, 70 against and 8 abstentions. 
35 E.-W. Böckenförde, Kirchlicher Auftrag und politische Entscheidung (Freiburg, 1973), 201; E.-W. 
Böckenförde, Religionsfreiheit: Die Kirche in der modernen Welt (Freiburg, 1990), 26-27, 55, 69, 108. 
36 Y. M.-J. Congar, “Was besagt die Bezeichning ‘Erklärung’?,” in J. Hamer & Y. Congar, 53-58; O.H. Pesch, Das 
Zweite Vatikanische Konzil (Würzburg, 1994),78-81. 
37 W. Kasper, “Religionsfreiheit, II. Katholische Kirche,“ in Staatslexikon, Recht, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Band 4, 
(Freiburg, 1988), 825-827. 
AEJT 7 (June 2006)   van der Ven / Multicultural Drama 
 9 
dignity of political office. In moral philosophy it was broadened to the inherent dignity of 
all human beings. In the Middle Ages Boethius gave it aesthetic overtones: human dignity 
is a thing of beauty, a piece of art to be enjoyed. In the Renaissance Pico della Mirandola 
stressed that human dignity is not just a fact but an injunction, a project: human beings are 
the creators of their own human dignity. During the Enlightenment, finally, Immanuel 
Kant defined the concept in a unique fashion. Human dignity, he said, resides in the fact 
that human beings represent ends in themselves. That means that they can never be used 
simply as a means. They have intrinsic value, cannot be bought at any price  neither a 
financial, economic, political or psychological price, nor a religious or an ecclesiastic price. 
People are not to be regarded as pawns, bondsmen, slaves, prostitutes, numbers; they are 
not to be deployed, used, traded, bought, hired out, sold, tortured or killed for external 
interests or even values.38 
In the Catholic Church, too, the term ‘human dignity’ has a history. It has played a 
focal role ever since the so-called social encyclicals, of which Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum of 
1891 was the first. That was the first time that, in the context of human dignity, a lance 
was broken for human rights, especially workers’ rights to property and association. A few 
decades later Pius IX elaborated on these ideas, extending them to the rights of the human 
person and democracy. Pius XII further strengthened the link between human dignity, 
human rights and democracy. But it was only in the pontificate of John XXIII that a 
Christian doctrine of human rights was worked out, thus laying the foundation for two 
cardinal documents of Vatican II: the Constitution on Church and World, Gaudium et Spes, 
and the aforementioned Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis humanae. 
That does not mean that either document is perfect and needs no augmentation. 
Thus there is no mention of the notion, for example, that people are free to choose, not 
only a religious worldview, but also a nonreligious one.39 By the same token they do not 
say that people are free to change their religion, hence to change from Islam to Christianity 
or from Christianity to Islam.40 
But that is not the point I wish to make right now. There is another aspect in 
connection with the multicultural society that merits attention. Ideally religious freedom 
should not feature only in the category of individual human rights but also in that of 
                                                             
38 J.A. van der Ven et al., Is there a God of Human Rights?, 265-280. 
39 This also leaves people free to make propaganda for such a nonreligious worldview, just as religious people 
are free to make propaganda and do missionary work for their religions; J. Witte, Religion and the American 
Constitutional Experiment (Boulder, 2005), 162-163. 
40 On the contrary. It applies to all people that once they have made a religious choice, they have to adhere it, 
especially in the case of Catholics (see Dignitatis humanae no. 1). This principle forms part of traditional 
church doctrine, explicitly formulated by Thomas Aquinas, who posits that nobody may be forced to embrace 
the church’s faith, but having once embraced it, the person is no longer at liberty to leave the church (Thomas 
Aquinas, STh II-II 10, 8; R. Frost, Toleranz im Konflikt, 93). Two comments are in order. Firstly, if one 
universalises the injunction that once a religious choice has been made one has to abide by it to other religions 
as well, it conflicts with the church’s missionary mandate (cf. Lumen Gentium no. 17). After all, mission aims at 
converting nonreligious and non-Christian groups to Christianity, hence at change rather than remaining in 
the religious community that one had originally chosen. In his lecture to  the Pontifical Mission Societies in 2000 
cardinal Tomko, prefect of the mission congregation, cited the fact that 2 billion people now belong to a Christian 
church, and a billion to the Catholic Church. This means that mission was and remains a must, he said, especially 
because the growth of Catholicism at 17.4% lags behind that of non-Christians - this does not apply to Africa but to 
Asia, where the church reaches a mere 2.9% and in some countries as little as 0.5% of the population. Secondly, the 
command to remain true to one’s original religious choice also conflicts with human rights law, for article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 says that people are free to choose their religion, but also that 
a person has the “freedom to change his religion or belief”. 
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collective rights.41 Let me clarify this with reference to the first generation of human 
rights, which regards to liberty rights, political rights and judicial rights. If these rights are 
interpreted as collective rights as well, Muslims and other religious communities would be 
entitled, as collectivities, to religious freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of 
association en non-discrimination, such as, especially, impartial treatment in criminal and 
criminal procedure law. By the same token it can be applied to second generation of 
human rights, which are mainly socio-economic in nature. Thus Muslims and other 
religious groups would be entitled, as collectivities, to work, income, education, health care 
and social security. And that would link up perfectly with the third generation of human 
rights, which are actually known as collective rights and entitle collectivities to enjoy their 
culture, language and religion.42 After all, cultural and religious minorities have a right to 
be different, as the Unesco Declaration on Race and Prejudice of 1978 (art. 1) puts it.43 By 
focusing on these rights of cultural and religious minorities as right of collectivities one 
could create a good framework for interaction between cultures and religions. Viewed 
thus, the neo-liberal policy currently adopted by the European Union, which only takes 
account of individual members of minorities and no longer of minorities as collectivities, 
needs to be fundamentally amended.44 
This advocacy of human rights specifically for the benefit of minorities as 
collectivities may raise the question whether it does not simply form part of the 
equipment of a constitutional state, making it redundant to highlight its importance. Those 
who take the noises made by minorities seriously will know that there are weighty 
problems in this regard. There are many indications that second and third generation 
Muslim youths have gloomy prospects, because they are not being helped to reduce the 
relatively severe poverty, prevent the high educational dropout rate, combat high 
unemployment and put an end to the high level of criminality. As a result they experience 
feelings of non-acceptance, mistrust, exclusion, marginalisation and a negative self-image. 
This in its turn leads to problem behaviour and behavioural disorders,45 which create a 
breeding ground for anti-Western notions. Such notions are traceable to the anti-
democratic Dawa in mosques, the informal Dawa of individual itinerant preachers and the 
virtual Dawa on the internet, inspired by traditions in Salaphism and Wahhabism.46 
                                                             
41 According to M. Galenkamp, Individualism versus Collectivism: The Concept of Collective Rights (Rotterdam: 
Rotterdamse Filosofische Studies, 1993), collective rights may be seen either as the rights of a collectivity of 
individuals or as relating to the collective dimension of individual rights, or as the rights of a legal person, or as 
rights of groups or communities as such 
42 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (art. 27); cf. W. Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); W. Kymlicka (ed.), The rights of minority cultures, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford1995; M. Mutua, Human rights. A political and cultural critique,University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia, 2002. 
43 J.A. van der Ven et al., Is there a God Human Rights?, 102-105. 
44 Nederland als immigratiesamenleving, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Den Haag 2001), 
229. 
45 W. Vollebergh, Gemiste kansen. Culturele diversiteit en de jeugdzorg,  Inaugural lecture, Radboud University 
Nijmegen 2002. 
46 The literature describes various factors, which also occur in combination, to explain the rise of Islamist 
movements: demographic factors (high fertility, high percentage of young people); economic factors (lack of 
economic development despite a great increase in oil dollars, resulting in poverty and protest); political 
factors (protest against the introduction of secular, democratic, Western structures); stratification-related 
factors (a frustrated, growing intelligentsia with no access to the machinery of state, the middle classes that 
are prepared to fund Islamism, the huge impoverished class that lets itself be mobilised for political action); 
and religious factors (protest by the religious elite against the political elite's efforts to subordinate Islam to 
the state and the use of religio-ideological protest by Islamism). According to this view Islamism is a largely 
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Although one cannot actually speak of a causal connection, all this could easily contribute 
to an atmosphere that may give rise to radical, even terrorist ideas and practices.47  
Or, one might ask, does Islam itself, irrespective of the social underclass to which 
many second and third generation youths belong, radiates an anti-democratic spirit? Do 
mosque and parliament simply not tolerate each other? Empirical research into the 
political culture and structure in 23 so-called Islamic countries reveals that the Shari’a can 
function under both (more or less) authoritarian and (more or less) democratic leadership 
structures: it all depends on the political interests the Shari’a is ideologically used for.48 In 
accordance with that, cross-national research shows that there is minimal difference 
between attitudes among the populations of Muslim and Western countries towards 
democracy versus authoritarian leadership.49 This fits in historical research by various 
scholars, who actually underline both the particular historical, contextual construction of 
the Shari’a and the plurality of interpretations in various societies in later times.50 In 
addition a growing number of scholars are reflecting positively, from a systematic point of 
view, on the compatibility of Islam, religious freedom and human rights.51 One positive 
sign could be that since 1981 three documents have been published that show that Islam 
is perfectly compatible with human rights: the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1981, the Cairo Declaration of 1990 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights 
adopted by the council of the League of Arab States in 1994.These documents do, however, 
contain turns of phrase like 'in so far as they concur with the Shari'a' or 'in so far as they 
do not conflict with the Shari'a', but the interpretation of these qualifications is left to the 
discretion of local religious leaders.52  
One could ask the same question of Christianity. Are Christianity and democracy 
compatible? If the answer is affirmative in principle, it begs the question whether 
Christianity in fact contributes to human rights. In this regard two colleagues, Jaco Dreyer 
and Hennie Pieterse, and I conducted a twelve-year research project in South Africa on the 
theme, “Is there a God of human rights?” That is to say, what is the real impact of belief in 
God and attitudes towards the church on commitment to human rights? Our findings were 
twofold: the effects are both positive and negative. When God is seen as a personal God, 
not remote but close to human beings, the effect is positive. Belief in a non-personal, more 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
secular movement that uses the ideological flag of Islam (cf. W. Wolters & N.-D. de Graaf, Maatschappelijke 
problemen: Beschrijvingen en verklaringen (Amsterdam: Boom, 2005), 282-284). 
47 G. Kepel, Fitna, Guerre au Coeur de l’Islam (Paris, 2004); AIVD, Van Dawa tot jihad: De diverse dreigingen van 
de radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde (Den Haag, 2004); Annual Report AIVD (De Haag, 2005), 
33-34. 
48 D.E. Price, Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Westport: Praeger, 
1999). The population comprised 23 Islamic countries (80% being Islamic) and 23 non-Muslim  developing 
countries, the latter randomly selected from the World Bank’s list of developing countries (p. 149); cf. O. Roy, 
Globalized Islam (New York, 2004), 148-200. 
49 P. Norris & R. Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge, 2004). 
50 M. Arkoun, The Unthought in Comtemporary Islamic Thought (London: Saqi Books, 2002). 
51 Some publications: Sultan Hussein Tabandeh, A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (London, 1970); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation (Syracuse, 1990); Ann E. 
Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (Boulder, 1991); Mohammed Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam 
(Cambridge, 1997); Farid Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism (Oxford, 1997); K. Noordam, R. van Oordt, C. 
Cörüz (eds), Mensen, rechten en islam (Amsterdam: Bulaaq, 1998); A. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for 
Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001); Talal Asad, 
Formations of the Secular (Stanford, 2003); J. Runzo, N. Martin, A. Sharma (eds.), Human Rights and 
Responsibilities in the World Religions (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003); Fatima Mernissi et al., Religie en moderniteit 
(Zutphen, 2004). 
52 A. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1991). 
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pantheistic God likewise has a positive effect. If the church is experienced as a prophetic 
community, professionally open to society and taking its decisions democratically, the 
effect is again positive. However, if God is seen as judgmental, punitive and vengeful, it has 
a negative impact. When the church is perceived as introverted, intent on its own survival, 
averse to professional knowledge to intervene in society and with a hierarchical, top-
down organisational structure, the impact is negative.53 
CONCLUSION 
Is Huntington right? As noted already, he rightly claims that we are living in a 
multicultural world. But he mistakenly avers that Western civilisation can only exist in a 
monocultural society. History tells a different story. Western civilisation in fact originated 
in multicultural empires: that of Alexander the Great and the Roman empire. Both are 
noted for a multicultural model of syncretism. The alternative was the monocultural 
model of oppression and persecution that prevailed from the 4th century to well into the 
Middle Ages. That was the uncivilised model of monocultural Western civilisation. The 
third model was that of permissive tolerance characterised by the disciplining of 
minorities, whose freedom was sacrificed to the truth of the majority’s power. The only 
truly civilised model of Western civilisation that respects the freedom, equality and 
reciprocity of both majority and minority is that of religious freedom in the framework of 
human rights. Put differently, in their book, Occidentalism, Ian Buruma and Avishai 
Margalit ask whether the mosque is human rights-minded enough or can be made so. This 
compels Christians to do some serious soul-searching: is the church human rights-minded 
enough or can it be made so?54 
Lastly let me return to Plato’s Republic with which I began this lecture. In Book VII, 
which consists of a report of Socrates’ dialogue with Glaucon, Plato presents the classic 
allegory of the cave. In the cave there is no light, everything is in the dark, and the people 
who are in the cave are blindly looking around. Outside of the cave there is light, bright 
light. When the people in the cave look out of the opening of the cave they see a wall and 
on that wall they see only the shadows of what happens in the bright light in the outside. 
They take these shadows for what happens in reality, but they are only shadows.55 That is 
the way our cities and their administrations and their governments and their citizens look: 
they think that their social programs for individual migrants are fair, but they do not see 
that these individual programs are only shadows of fairness, only shadows of justice, only 
shadows of goodness. When they could dispose of the four cardinal virtues and would 
have the courage and the wisdom and the self-mastery (temperance) to liberate 
themselves from the prison they live in within the cave and step into the bright light of the 
sun, the divine sun, that shines for each and everybody under the sun, then they would see 
that a city that really deserves that name, is a united city, a harmonious city, in short: one 
city, which is: a just city. 
 
                                                             
53 J.A. van der Ven et al., Is there a God of Human Rights?, 566-582. I confine myself to the effects of belief in God 
and attitudes towards the church as measured among senior secondary school students at Anglican and 
Catholic schools in the Johannesburg/Pretoria region in 1996 and 2001. Hence it excludes both the same 
category of students at public schools within the research project in 1995 and 2000, as well as the four other 
themes whose effects we researched (Jesus, evil, salvation and interreligious interaction). 
54 I. Buruma and A. Margalit, Occidentalism (New York, 2004). 
55 Plato, The Republic, [514-518], 253-258. 
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